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1
The issue discussed in this paper is as topical today as it was in the early modern period. The
Reformation presented with heightened urgency the question of how to relate the system of beliefs and values regarded as fundamental by an established political community to alternative beliefs and values introduced by new groups and individuals. Through a discussion of the views on toleration advanced by some key early modern thinkers, this paper will revisit different ways of addressing this problem, focusing on the relationship between truth and toleration. The comparison between different proposals in their historical and political contexts, will reveal a variety of understandings of toleration and of models for its promotion. These understandings will be shown to be grounded in different conceptions of religious belief, of its relation to truth, and of human reason's ability to reach it. They will provide a map of possible models for addressing conflict in a pluralist world from which lessons of enduring relevance can be learnt.
The upshot of the paper is that, from a theoretical point of view, the culprit in intolerance is not in itself belief in some objective truth. Some of the common assumptions about the denial of religious truth or the reduction of religious truth to a minimal creed as the best paths to universal toleration will be challenged. Likewise, the narrative centred on England and France which has led to the celebration of the heroes of a supposedly 'universal' toleration that still manages to exclude millions of people will be shown to be in need of 2 conscience and on the unknowability of religious truths above human reason, the paper will finally investigate whether grounds for a general and principled theory of toleration can be found in religious truth itself and, following the tradition of natural law, in some universal truth discoverable by natural reason.
The denial of religious truth as a path to toleration
With the outbreak of the Protestant reformation in the early sixteenth century, the clash between diverse religious communities and their systems of beliefs and values intensified. If the horror of early modern wars and persecutions ultimately resulted from disagreement about the objective truth of some fine points of theology, it is tempting to conclude that one straight-forward way to avoid such disasters in the future would be the elimination of the very notion of religious truth. Such an elimination could be pursued in a number of ways. For instance, once could argue that there is some sort or another of objective truth, just not a religious one. Voltaire's witty depiction of religious sects in the Lettres Philosophiques (1734) went a long way toward suggesting that the best basis for toleration was a throughgoing scepticism toward any claim to truth of alleged divine revelations. If there is any religious truth, Voltaire claimed in the article "Foi" (Faith) of his Dictionnaire philosophique (1764), this is discovered by reason not by faith:
It is evident to me that there is a necessary, eternal, supreme, intelligent being. This is not a matter of faith, but of reason. I have no merit in thinking that this eternal, infinite being, who is virtue, goodness itself, wants me to be good and virtuous. Faith consists in believing, not what appears to be true, but what appears to our understanding to be false. 2 A more radical, and philosophically more original, denial of any pretence of faith to truth had already been proposed by Baruch Spinoza.
3 Spinoza had himself suffered religious 4 of certain beliefs about God such that, without these beliefs, there cannot be obedience to
God." 8 From this separation followed, for Spinoza, that faith allows to every man the utmost freedom to philosophise, and he may hold whatever opinions he pleases on any subjects whatsoever without imputation of evil. It condemns as heretics and schismatics only those who teach such beliefs as promote obstinacy, hatred, strife and anger, while it regards as faithful only those who promote justice and charity to the best of their intellectual powers and capacity. 9 In brief, provided that religious beliefs led to obedience and piety, it did not matter what one believed since, in any case, such beliefs did not have to do with truth. Nonetheless, Spinoza went on to identify the only dogmas which "a catholic or universal faith" should contain,
namely "those dogmas which obedience to God absolutely demands, and without which such obedience is absolutely impossible." 10 These dogmas must all be directed (as evidently follows from what we have demonstrated …) to this one end: that there is a Supreme Being who loves justice and charity, whom all must obey in order to be saved, and must worship by practising justice and charity to their neighbour. From this, all the tenets of faith can readily be determined, and they are simply as follows: 1. God, that is, a Supreme Being, exists, supremely just and merciful Consistently with the divorce between faith and truth, the chief criterion for the identification of these dogmas was not their truth but their being conducive to obedience. Spinoza's 8 TTP, chap.14 (p. 516).
9 TTP, chap.14 (p. 519).
10 TTP, chap.14 (p. 517). My emphasis.
11 TTP, chap.14 (pp. 517-8).
5 philosophical investigation culminating in the Ethica made abundantly clear that God is not really a personal being with moral attributes such as justice and mercy. Belief in such a being, however, was to be commended since it led those incapable of reaching truth to charity and love of the neighbour, motivated by obedience to a God imagined as just and merciful.
One may wonder, however, to which extent such divorce is in itself conducive to a general and principled theory of toleration. Spinoza clearly thought that there are plenty of truths which reason and philosophy can reach. They include, for instance, the claim that without such dogmas as the unicity of God "obedience is absolutely impossible". Moreover, he claimed, "devotion to one's country is the highest form of devotion".
16
Before adopting Spinoza as the standard-bearer of modernity one should carefully consider the danger of transforming this "devotion" into an authoritarian form of secular religion, attested only too often in the past and by no means absent from the present.
To be sure, Spinoza was clear that freedom of thought is inalienable. Hobbes had already drawn attention to the difference between inner faith (fides), which cannot be compelled, and external profession, which can (and, for Hobbes, should) be enforced as a merely external act of obedience to the worship prescribed by the sovereign. 17 In a similar way, Spinoza distinguished between "inward worship of God" and "outward forms of religion":
I speak expressly of acts of piety and the outward forms of religion, not of piety itself and the inward worship of God, or of the means whereby the mind is inwardly led to worship God in sincerity of heart; for inward worship of God and piety itself belong to the sphere of individual right … which cannot be transferred to another.
18
However, as he would have known from his own Jewish upbringing (and, more specifically, from the Marranos experience), the public and socially shared worship of one's religious beliefs may well be integral to those very religious beliefs. It would not do, therefore, to say that anyone is completely free to believe whatever they wish and inwardly worship whichever way they want, if their religious beliefs include the need to worship publically, Once again, whether such belief belongs, or does not belong, in the realm of applicability of the notion of truth, seems neutral to the question of whether such belief should be tolerated. Thus, should a sovereign allow, in principle, public worship which does not align with the religion of the land? It seems not, according to Spinoza. As for Hobbes, freedom of belief does not entail freedom of worship in which belief finds its expression. The enlightened philosopher who reads the Ethica will know that it does not matter in the least to engage in external acts of divine worship. The (seemingly largely fictional) followers of the 'universal' faith will believe it. The others will either be lucky enough to belong to the official state worship, or will be left with the (at least practical) intolerance of their beliefs.
The view that 'truth' is an inapplicable category for any religious belief may even help account for Spinoza's willingness to let government a free hand in curbing and shaping acceptable worship. The fact that the government in question should be, ideally, a democracy does not seem to help either. That is, the fact that the rules of official worship are dictated not by a monarch but a government supported by a majority does not in itself advance the principled toleration of those who, precisely due to their status of minorities, are most in need of it.
22
Historically, Spinoza's appeal to a drastically pared-down dogmatic content aimed not at truth but at a practical attitude was undoubtedly meant to promote the pacification of religious conflicts. His claim that "religious law" is dependent on the decision of "those who 20 TTP, chap.14 (p. 518).
21 TTP, chap.14 (p. 517). 22 Cf. Forst, Toleration in Conflict, pp. 205-6.
hold the sovereign power" as the sole "interpreters of the divine law", 23 was historically aimed at thwarting, through the intervention of political authority, opposing religious factions which were threatening peace. As a universalizable rule, however, it was all too easily convertible into state-led religious repression and persecution. 24 In the Netherlands, the Remostrants (or Arminians) found at their own expenses that Arminius and Grotius's political theories, entrusting the summa potestas to the magistrate also in religious matters, did not result in the religious tolerance they were hoping for. 25 In England, the religious intolerance which followed the restoration of the Stuarts eventually convinced Locke to abandon his early view that the jus circa sacra falls on the sovereign as Conservator Pacis In the early modern period, versions of this doctrine went back at least as far as the humanist approach of Erasmus, who proposed a distinction between the "childish trifles", or adiaphora, which divide the Church, and the essential core of Christianity, for the discovery of which it is necessary to go back to the sources of the Christian faith, the gospels. 73 In Remonstrant circles, all main authors embraced versions of the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental articles as a way to overcome ecclesiastical divisions, including Arminius, Grotius, and Limborch.
Likewise, in the Anglican Church, the focus on the core truths of Christianity, leaving the rest to the freedom of opinion, shaped Latitudinarian theology. 80 TTP, chap.14 (pp. 517-8). As discussed above, the category of 'truth' does not really apply to these dogmas.
24
Leviathan, "is this, that Jesus is the Christ." 81 Everything else, including which consequences follow or do not follow from this single article, was for the sovereign to regulate.
82
Other authors of various stripes drew up their own lists of what was necessary and sufficient for salvation, increasingly basing the short-listing process on the reduction of religion to natural religion. 83 As early as 1633, Herbert of Cherbury's De Veritate identified five notitiae communes (common notions) in which was distilled the fundamental content of true religion. These common notions (namely, that there is a supreme Deity, that worship is due to this supreme Deity, that the most important aspect of this worship was a life of virtue and piety, that vices and wicked actions must be expiated by repentance, and that there is reward or punishment after this life), defined, in his view, the true catholic or universal church. 84 Since "God, at all Times, has given Mankind sufficient Means, of knowing whatever he requires of them," Matthew Tindal argued in 1730, there was no need for churches and their worship. "The Religion of Nature is an absolutely perfect Religion;
and…external Revelation can neither add to, nor take from its Perfection." On the contrary, any deviation from natural religion could only be detrimental to true religion. 85 Last but not least, Jean-Jacques Rousseau's idea of a minimalist "civil religion" as a necessary basis for maintaining sovereignty, stretched into the eighteenth century Hobbes' inheritance of a state entrusted with religion and morality. 
The unknowability of religious truth as a path to toleration
A different approach which fully acknowledged revealed truths while opening a path to toleration was based on the traditional distinction between "contrary to reason" and "above reason". 88 Both Locke and Leibniz defended an epistemic space for truths which are "above religion. This is shown not least by where the limits of toleration are drawn, namely with those who do not agree with this core religion, and this concerns not just atheists" (p. 262).
reason," while adamantly rejecting the claim that there can be truths "against reason." Their religious epistemologies sharply distinguished between the sphere of knowledge and the sphere of belief and faith. 89 The proper epistemic sphere of faith was, for them, the sphere of truths "above reason" which are not known but believed. Such beliefs, however, ought to be rationally justified. In other words, according to their conceptions of knowledge, truths "above reason" are unknowable but not irrational.
This was not, however, a sceptical position, since the objective truth of revelation was fully endorsed. 90 In fact, according to them, there are also religious truths which are demonstrable (e.g. the existence of God) and which are, therefore, knowable. On the other hand, most religious truths cannot, in the strict sense of the term, be known, leading to a religious epistemology which is tolerant toward religious diversity. However, to avoid the risk of falling into religious fanaticism or "enthusiasm," we must be sure that what we are believing is a genuine divine revelation, and not something absurd or irrational. Locke distinguished therefore between propositions which are "according to reason," propositions which are "against reason," and propositions which are "above reason"
-the latter constituting, as we have seen, the proper sphere of faith.
95
Leibniz proposed a similar religious epistemology. 96 "A truth will never be against reason," we read in the Theodicy, "and very far from a dogma fought and refuted by reason 93 Locke, Essay, Book IV, chap. xv, § 2 and 3. 94 Locke, Essay, Book IV, chap. xvi, § 14. 
Religious truth as a path to toleration
Revealed truth embraced by faith could, in turn, help ground an inclusive theory of toleration. Only a theory grounded in universal truths, presented by the natural light of reason common to all human beings, could aspire to true generality. This stress on universality was in itself nothing new to the early modern period. In fact, it constituted the backbone of medieval theories of natural law of which Thomas Aquinas had given the most influential formulation.
In one of his writings, Aquinas stated that the natural law "is nothing other than the light of intellect infused within us by God. Thanks to this, we know what must be done and what must be avoided. This light or this law has been given by God to creation." In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the grounding of natural law in eternal reason was sized upon by Jesuit thought to stress the independence of natural law from any will, including the will of God. 124 Francisco Suarez distinguished between 'content' and 'form' of natural law. Grotius went further, attempting to show that not only the 'content' of natural law would be valid independently of God's will; there could be 'obligation' to follow the natural law even without God because the honouring of rights was good and obligatory in itself. 125 In this way, Grotius prepared the ground for a notion of moral autonomy of human beings on which a general and principled theory of toleration could be founded.
Independently of particular religious views, or even of any reference to God, human beings could appeal to a universal rule of reciprocity presented by the natural light of reason. it is against natural right to punish someone because he is of some opinion, no matter which, as opposed to punishing someone for some actions; for the penalty for one who is mistaken is to be taught. And again, I do not believe that we have the right to punish someone with corporal pains for actions which he undertakes in accordance with his opinion, and which he believes his conscience obligates him to perform, unless these actions are evil in themselves, manifestly contrary to natural right. As if someone wanted to trouble the State and use violence and poison for a religious principle.
Conclusion
In theory and in practice, the paths to toleration are, and have been, many. The question of which one is most appropriate or most effective is inextricably interwoven with the historical contexts in which it was developed. Historically, each path has shown its merits but also its shortcomings. The chief aim of this paper has been to evaluate the relationship between truth and toleration. Its main conclusion is that, from a theoretical point of view, the culprit in intolerance is not in itself belief in some objective truth. On the contrary, the acknowledgment of some universal truth discoverable by natural reason and endorsed by many religious traditions, such as the 'golden rule' of reciprocity, can provide the underpinning of a general and principled theory of toleration.
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Moreover, it is not belief in some religious truth and in its objectivity which is per se intolerant. For instance, one may regard as a religious truth that religious coercion is against the spirit of the gospel or that Jihad should be interpreted as an internal struggle to become good, not as a call to holy war against all infidels. Nor is the denial of religious truth in itself a path to toleration. Historically, it has also been a route to intolerance, as communist totalitarianisms of the twentieth century have shown. Vigilance seems also to be needed 
